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INTRODUCTION
The rise and fall of the Employee Free Choice Act
(“EFCA”)1 has been one of the hottest topics in labor law in
the past few decades. With the Democrats losing their
majority in the U.S. House of Representatives in the 2010
midterm elections and watching their majority in the U.S.
Senate shrink, the prospects of the proposed EFCA becoming
legislation have become far less likely.2 Before the 2010
midterm elections, the potential passage of the EFCA
provoked several States to try and undercut the impact the
legislation would have.3 Four States, specifically Arizona,4
South Carolina,5 South Dakota,6 and Utah,7 enacted state
constitutional amendments in 2010 that protected an
employee’s right to a secret ballot election during union
representation elections.8 On January 14, 2011, the Acting
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
1. The EFCA is a piece of proposed legislation that would make the
voluntary recognition procedure, one of the tools employees can use to select a
union as their bargaining representative, more favorable to unions. See infra
Part II.A. Furthermore, the proposed bill also includes other provisions that
would be favorable to unions. See infra Part II.A. Some of those provisions
would impose timelines on management to negotiate a collective bargaining
agreement with a union. See infra Part II.A. If those timelines were not met,
the dispute would go to an alternative dispute resolution proceeding, including
binding arbitration. See infra Part II.A.
2. See infra notes 179–80 and accompanying text.
3. See Jay Sumner, Four States Approve Constitutional Amendments
Guaranteeing Right to Secret Ballot Union Elections, LAB. REL. COUNS. (Nov.
04, 2010), available at http://www.laborrelationscounsel.com/efca/four-statesapprove-constitutional-amendments-guaranteeing-right-to-secret-ballot-unionelections/.
4. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 37 (“The right to vote by secret ballot for employee
representation is fundamental and shall be guaranteed where local, state or
federal law permits or requires elections, designations or authorizations for
employee representation.”).
5. S.C. CONST. art. II, § 12 (“The fundamental right of an individual to vote
by secret ballot is guaranteed for a designation, a selection, or an authorization
for employee representation by a labor organization.”).
6. S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 28 (“The rights of individuals to vote by secret
ballot is fundamental. If any state or federal law requires or permits an election
for public office, for any initiative or referendum, or for any designation or
authorization of employee representation, the right of any individual to vote by
secret ballot shall be guaranteed.”).
7. UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 8, cl. 1 (“All elections, including elections under
state or federal law for public office, on an initiative or referendum, or to
designate or authorize employee representation or individual representation,
shall be by secret ballot.”).
8. See Sumner, supra note 3.
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(“NLRB” or “the Board”) contacted the Attorneys General of
these four States informing them that the National Labor
Relations Act (“NLRA”) preempts any state law requiring the
use of secret ballots in union representation elections.9 These
letters requested responses from each of the States in two
weeks.10 The Acting General Counsel indicated that the
NLRB would initiate civil actions in federal court to have the
state constitutional amendments invalidated if each state did
not acknowledge that its respective constitutional
amendment was preempted.11
In response, these four Attorneys General wrote a joint
letter back to the Acting General Counsel of the NLRB on
January 27, 2011.12 They rejected the NLRB’s demands to
“stipulate to the unconstitutionality” of the state
constitutional amendments.13 The Attorneys General argued
that these state constitutional amendments protected “long
existing federal rights” and that they would “vigorously
defend any legal attack upon them.”14 The letter emphasized
that the state constitutional amendments were consistent
with current federal law.15 The Acting General Counsel of the
NLRB then responded on February 22, 2011 to the letter from
the four Attorneys General, stating in the letter:
As you have unanimously expressed the opinion that the
State Amendments can all be construed in a manner
consistent with federal law, I believe your letter may
provide a basis upon which this matter can be resolved
without the necessity of costly litigation. My staff will
shortly be in contact with the staff members you have
designated to explore this issue further.16
9. See NLRB, NLRB Advises Four States that Constitutional Amendments
Conflict with Federal Labor Law, NLRB.GOV, http://www.nlrb.gov/newsmedia/backgrounders/state-amendments-and-preemption (last visited Mar. 28,
2012) (linking to each of the four letters); Seth Borden, NLRB Asserts State
Secret Ballot Laws Are Unconstitutional, LAB. REL. TODAY (Jan. 16, 2010),
http://www.laborrelationstoday.com/2011/01/articles/nlra/nlrb-asserts-statesecret-ballot-laws-are-unconstitutional/.
10. See sources cited supra note 9.
11. See sources cited supra note 9.
12. Letter from State Attorneys General to Lafe E. Solomon, Acting General
Counsel, NLRB 1 (Jan. 27, 2011), available at http://attorneygeneral.utah.gov/
cmsdocuments/nlrb012711.sol.pdf.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 1–2.
16. Letter from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting General Counsel, NLRB, to State
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However, on April 22, 2011, the Acting General Counsel
informed the four Attorneys General that the NLRB would
initiate lawsuits in Arizona and South Dakota.17 On May 6,
2011, the NLRB initiated litigation against the state of
Arizona regarding its amendment.18 More litigation will
likely follow suit against the other States.
This Article will use this conflict between the NLRB and
these four States to analyze many of the issues surrounding
the EFCA, voluntary recognition, and labor preemption in
general. The Article will also discuss some new regulations
proposed by the NLRB that have reignited the debate over
the EFCA to some extent. Lastly, the Article will examine
the likely resolution of the preemption issue raised by these
state constitutional amendments. Part I of this Article will
discuss the voluntary recognition procedure and the
recognition bar, including the effects the In re Dana Corp.19
decision had on the recognition bar and the state of the
recognition bar after the NLRB recently overruled In re Dana
Corp. Part I will also discuss some newly proposed NLRB
regulations that will have a significant impact on union
recognition determinations.
Part II will address the terms of the EFCA to the extent
that they affect voluntary recognition and the policy
arguments for and against the act’s implementation. Part III
of this Article will look at the congressional history of the
EFCA. Part IV will examine preemption generally and the
various preemption doctrines in the area of labor law. Part V
will assess the preemptive effects the NLRA has on these
state constitutional amendments providing a right to a secret
ballot election in the context of union representation. Given
the lengthy history of federal regulation of labor-management
relations and a long track record of federal courts finding
Attorneys
General
1
(Feb.
2,
2011),
available
at
http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/234/feb_2_letter.pdf.
17. Letter from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting General Counsel, NLRB, to State
Attorneys
General
1
(Apr.
22,
2011),
available
at
http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/234/april_22_letter_from_gc_t
o_states.pdf (“After carefully considering your responses to my letters and in
view of the seeming impossibility of settling this dispute without litigation, I
have directed my staff to initiate lawsuits in federal court . . . .”).
18. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 1–5, NLRB v. Arizona, (D. Ariz.
May 6, 2011), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/234/azcomplaint.pdf.
19. In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007).
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state labor laws preempted if they would undermine the
NLRA, preemption in the area of labor law is the norm rather
than the exception.20 The NLRB will likely be successful in
challenging these state constitutional amendments as
preempted under the NLRA.
I.

UNDERSTANDING THE VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION
PROCEDURE

Employees seeking union representation may take
advantage of two primary routes to secure union
representation: (1) an NLRB conducted election; or (2)
voluntary recognition.21 After watching union membership
steadily decline in the second half of the twentieth century
and experiencing a frustration with the process of NLRB
conducted elections, voluntary recognition in the past decade
has increasingly become the preferred route for union
certification.22
However, some newly proposed NLRB
regulations may make an NLRB conducted election a more
desirable option for unions.23 First, this section will discuss
the voluntary recognition procedure in general. Second, this
section will examine the recognition bar to an NLRB
conducted election and the effect the recent Dana Corp.
decision has had on this bar. Third, this section will address
some new rules proposed by the NLRB that will have a
significant impact on current union recognition procedures.

20. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1572–74 (2002) (“Garmon and Machinists together
virtually banish states and localities from the field of labor relations.” (citing to
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) and Lodge 76,
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 140
(1976)); infra Part IV.
21. See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 304–06
(1974); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596–98 (1969).
22. James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition:
Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 825–30; Laura J.
Cooper, Privatizing Labor Law: Neutrality/Card Check Agreements and the
Role of the Arbitrator, 83 IND. L.J. 1589, 1591 (2008); Joel Dillard & Jennifer
Dillard, Fetishizing the Electoral Process: The National Labor Relations Board’s
Problematic Embrace of Electoral Formalism, 6 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 819,
819 (2008) (“The success of these unions [who have had success with voluntary
recognition] has led most unions to largely reject the slow, cumbersome, and
ineffective Board processes for obtaining legal representation of the
employees.”).
23. See infra Part I.C.
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A. Voluntary Recognition as an Alternative to an NLRB
Conducted Election
Section 9(a) of the NLRA allows unions to obtain
authorization to act as the exclusive bargaining agents for
employees without NLRB conducted elections when they are
“designated or selected” as representatives by a majority of
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit.24 This language
has been interpreted by the NLRB and the Supreme Court as
authorizing union representation through means other than
NLRB conducted elections.25 While recognizing the place
voluntary recognition has in the NLRA statutory scheme, the
United States Supreme Court and the NLRB have both
shown a preference for NLRB conducted elections.26 The
degree of this preference among the individual NLRB
members can vary significantly as revealed by the deep
division between the majority and the dissent in the recent
Dana Corp. decision.27
As a method of obtaining union representation, voluntary
recognition is the primary alternative to an NLRB conducted
election.28 A union can obtain voluntary recognition from an
employer to act as an exclusive bargaining agent by
demonstrating to the employer that the union has obtained
the majority support of the employees.29 A union can make
this demonstration to an employer by presenting to the

24. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006) (“Representatives designated or selected
for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a
unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all
the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment
. . . .”).
25. See Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 304–06; Gissel, 395 U.S. at 596–98.
26. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 596; In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 438–41
(2007).
27. Compare In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. at 438–40 (criticizing the
pressure imposed on employees by unions in the voluntary recognition
procedure, misinformation by unions in voluntary recognition drives, and the
unreliability of authorization cards compared with secret ballots), with id. at
444–50 (Liebman and Walsh, dissenting in part) (“Voluntary recognition is ‘a
favored element of national labor policy.’ Yet, the majority decision relegates
voluntary recognition to disfavored status by allowing a minority of employees
to hijack the bargaining process just as it is getting started. Ultimately, the
majority decision effectively discourages voluntary recognition altogether.”).
28. See Dillard & Dillard, supra note 22, at 819.
29. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 596; MICHAEL C. HARPER ET AL., LABOR LAW:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 407 (6th ed. 2007).
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employer cards bearing a majority of the employees’
signatures within the bargaining unit or through some other
appropriate method.30 When using cards, the cards must be
unambiguous in that they state on their face that the signer
authorizes the union to represent the employee for collective
bargaining purposes and not to seek an election.31 An
employer always has the right to refuse to voluntarily
recognize a union and demand an election32 but can agree
voluntarily to relinquish this right.33
As part of the voluntary recognition process, the
prospective union may ask the employer to sign a card check
agreement and/or a neutrality agreement.34 Under a card
check agreement, the employer agrees that if the union
obtains cards from a majority of employees in the bargaining
unit authorizing the union to represent the employee that the
employer will recognize and bargain with the union.35 The
employer also agrees as part of a card check agreement to
forego its legal right to insist upon an NLRB conducted
election.36 Under a neutrality agreement, the employer
agrees that if the union seeks to organize its employees that
the employer will remain neutral while its employees decide
whether they want union representation.37 More specifically,
the employer declines to exercise certain rights to
communicate with employees that it would otherwise enjoy
under the NLRA and potentially allows the prospective union
means of access to and communication with employees that
the employer would not be required to permit under the
NLRA.38 The exact extent of neutrality an employer agrees to
maintain and the degree to which the employer preserves or

30. See sources cited supra note 29. Other methods unions and employers
have used in the past include methods “as informal as employees walking into
the owner’s office and stating they wish to be represented by a union and formal
as a secret-ballot election conducted by a third party such as the American
Arbitration Association.” In re Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 3
(2011) (citations omitted).
31. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 597.
32. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 309–10
(1974).
33. Cooper, supra note 22, at 1590–91.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1590.
38. Id.
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waives various means of communication with the employees
can vary significantly depending on the particular
agreement.39
Prospective unions often desire these types of agreements
for several reasons: (1) the effect employer campaigning and
interaction with employees has on the ultimate outcome of a
union campaign;40 (2) the general advantage employers have
when it comes to access to their employees;41 (3) the
longstanding conflict a bitter campaign between a union and
the employer can breed in the workplace;42 and (4) the success
many unions have had with voluntary recognition as opposed
to NLRB conducted elections.43 Additionally, some studies
have indicated that employers and unions have a higher
chance of quickly finalizing a collective bargaining agreement
when they take advantage of voluntary recognition as
opposed to using an NLRB conducted election.44
39. See Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under
Neutrality and Card Check Agreements, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 42, 47
(2001) (compiling 118 employer neutrality agreements and comparing the types
of provisions that appear in each agreement).
40. See Brudney, supra note 22, at 832–33.
41. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006) (“The expressing [by an employer] of
any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in
written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of
an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.”);
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 537 (1992) (recognizing that
nonemployee union members have very limited rights to be on an employer’s
property); Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 409 (1953) (allowing an
employer to refuse to allow unions to address employees as part of a captive
audience and acknowledging that an employer may have captive audience
meetings).
42. See, e.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 58
(1966) (“Indeed, representation campaigns are frequently characterized by
bitter and extreme charges, countercharges, unfounded rumors, vituperations,
personal accusations, misrepresentations and distortions. Both labor and
management often speak bluntly and recklessly, embellishing their respective
positions with imprecatory language.”).
43. See supra notes 22–33 and accompanying text.
44. See In re Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 8 n.26 (2011). The
NLRB in the Lamons Gasket Co. decision contrasted two studies that examined
how quickly employers and unions reached collective bargaining agreements
when using an NLRB conducted election as opposed to the voluntary recognition
procedure. See id. Those studies found that, based on the samplings in the
studies, an employer and a union finalized negotiations for a collective
bargaining agreement “within 2 years in only 56 percent of the cases” if an
NLRB conducted election occurred, as opposed to finalizing a collective
bargaining agreement “in close to 100 percent of cases” when using the
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Given that signing one of these agreements typically
makes it easier for the prospective union to successfully
become the representative of the employees, the reasons why
an employer would agree to sign these types of agreements
are not immediately apparent.45 One benefit to the employer
is the avoidance of potential economic losses associated with a
work stoppage, such as a strike or a lockout that could take
place due to a conflict arising between the employer and
prospective union during the union campaign.46 Another
reason is to prevent the disruptive short- and long-term
effects that a union picketing or handbilling campaign could
have on the employer’s business.47 The loss of a more
cooperative workplace culture also motivates some employers
to sign these agreements.48 Likewise, for employers familiar
with dealing with unions or for those who project minimal
cost increases from working with a union, a neutrality
agreement can sometimes save the employer more money
compared with the cost of a campaign on union
representation and the potential conflict involved.49
Collective bargaining negotiations may be less drawn out and
costly when an employer agrees to voluntary recognition as
well, presumably because the union and the employer already
have a relatively amicable position towards one another.50
However, some argue that employers sign these agreements
involuntarily because of harassment by union campaigners.51
B. The Recognition Bar
The voluntary recognition bar, normally just called the
recognition bar, is one of the various bars to an NLRB
conducted election.52 All of the various bars prevent the
holding of an NLRB conducted election for a specific
bargaining unit until a certain period of time (that varies
among the different bars) passes.53 The primary bars to an
voluntary recognition procedure. See id.
45. Brudney, supra note 22, at 835.
46. See id. at 836.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 836–37.
50. See Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 8 n.26 (2011).
51. Cooper, supra note 22, at 1592.
52. See infra notes 54–57, 61.
53. See infra notes 54–57, 61 and accompanying text.
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NLRB conducted election besides the recognition bar include
the election bar,54 the certification bar,55 the contract bar,56
and the settlement bar.57 Each of these bars trigger when a
certain event occurs, such as an NLRB conducted election or
the certification of a union by the NLRB.58 Once the
triggering event has occurred, these bars limit for a certain
period of time the holding of an NLRB conducted election to
certify or decertify a union.59 Consequently, these bars
provide some stability and regularity to the relationship
between labor and management.60
The recognition bar prevents anyone from requesting an
NLRB conducted election for the newly represented
bargaining unit and disallows an employer from withdrawing
its recognition of a union for a reasonable period of time after
an employer has voluntarily recognized a union that has
demonstrated majority support.61 A reasonable period of time
in this context does not depend on the number of months
spent bargaining between the employer and the union, but

54. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (2006) (“No election shall be directed in any
bargaining unit or any subdivision within which in the preceding twelve-month
period, a valid election shall have been held.”).
55. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98 (1954) (“A certification, if based on
a Board-conducted election, must be honored for a ‘reasonable’ period, ordinarily
‘one year,’ in the absence of ‘unusual circumstances.’ ” ). The certification bar is
not statutory in nature but instead emanates from the NLRB’s interpretation of
section 9. See id. at 98–102.
56. See Cind-R-Lite Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 1255, 1256 (1979); Appalachian Shale
Prods. Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1160, 1161–62 (1958). The contract bar doctrine
generally bars an election among employees covered by a valid and operative
collective bargaining agreement of reasonable duration. HARPER ET AL., supra
note 29, at 385. The policy behind the contract bar doctrine centers on
promoting stability in labor relations. Id.
57. See In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 440 (2007) (“At least since Poole
Foundry & Machine Co., the Board has held that an unfair labor practice
settlement agreement in which the employer agrees to bargain bars the filing of
a decertification petition within a reasonable period of time after the
agreement.” (footnote omitted) (citing Poole Foundry & Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 192
F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1951))).
58. See Brooks, 348 U.S. at 99–104; HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 385.
59. See sources cited supra note 58.
60. See sources cited supra note 58.
61. See Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 1 (2011); Keller Plastics
E., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 587 (1966). This particular bar arises from the NLRB’s
administrative authority rather than any specific requirement contained in the
NLRA. Keller Plastics E., 157 N.L.R.B. at 587; In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B.
at 434–35; HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 385.
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rather on what has transpired in the bargaining sessions.62
The NLRB has further clarified what qualifies as a
reasonable period of time in a recent decision, specifically
that it will “be no less than 6 months after the parties’ first
bargaining session and no more than 1 year.”63
The
recognition bar always applies to an employer starting from
the period that the employer voluntarily recognizes the union,
thus requiring the employer to bargain with the union
immediately.64 The NLRB’s recent Dana Corp. decision made
the rules more complex with respect to how the voluntary
recognition bar applies to the employees within the
bargaining unit seeking an NLRB conducted election to
decertify a union or a rival union filing its own election
petition.65 Although the NLRB has recently overruled that
decision,66 it is still important to understand the changes
Dana Corp. made.
Before the Dana Corp. decision, the recognition bar went
into effect immediately for all purposes following the
employer’s voluntary recognition of a union.67 However, the
NLRB concluded in Dana Corp. that employees within the
bargaining unit and rival unions should have a forty-five day
window to challenge the employer’s choice to voluntarily
recognize the union.68 This window does not begin until the
affected employees within the bargaining unit receive
adequate notice of the voluntary recognition and of their
opportunity to file for an NLRB election.69 After that window
has passed, the recognition bar goes into effect with respect to
employees in the bargaining unit and rival unions.70
62. Livent Realty, 328 N.L.R.B. 1, 1 (1999).
63. In re Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 10 (2011). To
determine exactly when a reasonable period of time has passed, courts consider
five factors: (1) whether the parties are bargaining for an initial contract; (2) the
complexity of the issues being negotiated and of the parties’ bargaining
processes; (3) the amount of time elapsed since bargaining commenced and the
number of bargaining sessions; (4) the amount of progress made in negotiations
and how near the parties are to concluding an agreement; and (5) whether the
parties are at impasse. See id. at 10 n.34.
64. In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. at 441–42.
65. See id.
66. See Lamons Gasket, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 1.
67. See id.; In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. at 437 (quoting Keller Plastics
E., 157 N.L.R.B. 583, 587 (1966)).
68. See In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. at 441–42.
69. Id. at 441.
70. See id. at 441–42.
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While the Dana Corp. decision has received a great deal
of criticism,71 many have also come out in support of it as
protective of workers’ rights.72 NLRB members Liebman and
Walsh wrote a scathing dissent to the majority’s decision.73
These two members criticized the majority’s departure from
established NLRB precedent dating back to the 1966 decision
in Keller Plastics Eastern.74
The dissenting members
continuously pointed out that the majority did not take into
account one of the key policies underlying the NLRA,
promoting stability in bargaining relationships.75 Likewise,
they emphasized that voluntary recognition is “a favored
element of national labor policy” that the majority was too
quick to criticize.76 These members articulated that the
election process leads to many of the same types of pressure
that the majority found to be unappealing about the
voluntary recognition process and that the majority’s
criticisms of the voluntary recognition process could be dealt
with in more effective ways than how the majority proposed.77
On August 26, 2011, the NLRB issued its decision in
Lamons Gasket Co., overruling the Dana Corp. decision.78 In
a three-to-one decision, the NLRB returned the state of the
71. See, e.g., Anne Marie Lofaso, The Persistence of Union Repression in an
Era of Recognition, 62 ME. L. REV. 199, 230 (2010) (“Dana Corp. symbolizes the
Bush II Board’s vigorous resistance to union organization and signals a new era
of government repression of unionization.”); Henry M. Willis, Organizing--With
or Without the NLRB: The Short-Term Prospects for Restoring Workers’ Right to
Organize, 66 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 115, 117 (2009) (“It is hard to overstate
the perverseness of that decision’s logic. Years of dealing with an NLRB that
was unable to protect workers from anti-union retaliation have driven down the
number of NLRB-conducted elections by more than 80 percent over the past
forty years.”).
72. See, e.g., N. Mott, Dana Corp and EFCA, NOLA EMPLOYERS BLOG (Sept.
17, 2010, 6:18 AM), http://nolaemployers.blogspot.com/2010/09/dana-corp-andefca.html (“In reality this approach created a rationale safety valve to prevent
coercive card check tactics. We have argued before unions should have
embraced this model and should have adopted it as their reform proposal. It
would have liberated the labor reform movement from the valid accusation it
was attempting to eliminate secret ballot elections.”).
73. See In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. at 444–50 (3-2 decision) (Liebman
and Walsh, dissenting in part).
74. See id. at 444 (“[N]othing in the majority’s decision justifies its radical
departure from that well-settled, judicially approved precedent.”).
75. See id.
76. See id. at 450 (quoting NLRB v. Lyon & Ryan Ford, Inc., 647 F.2d 745,
750 (7th Cir. 1981)).
77. See id. at 444–50.
78. See In re Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 1 (2011).
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recognition bar to what it was before the Dana Corp.
decision.79 The majority emphasized that Dana Corp. did not
provide an adequate rationale for its holding and did not rely
on empirical evidence to support a decision to depart from
established recognition bar precedent, which dates back to
1966.80 The majority emphasized that Congress authorized
voluntary recognition as a valid alternative to an NLRB
conducted election, a consideration it believed the Dana Corp.
decision did not adequately take into account.81 The NLRB
also felt that Dana Corp. created procedures that “placed the
Board’s thumb decidedly on one side,” the side of employers,
“of what should be a neutral scale.”82 It also stressed the
awkwardness of complying with these procedures and their
unwelcome novelty.83
The rationale that the Board focused on the most in
overruling Dana Corp. was the basic policy underlying all of
the various bars to NLRB conducted elections, that “newly
created bargaining relationship should be given a reasonable
chance to succeed before being subject to challenge.”84 The
majority felt that Dana Corp.’s procedures stressed to an
improper degree the allegedly coercive nature of the
voluntary recognition process without taking into account the
NLRA’s goals of reducing industrial strife.85 The NLRB also
clarified what qualifies as a reasonable period of time in
determining the length which the recognition bar applies,
specifically that it will “be no less than 6 months after the
parties’ first bargaining session and no more than 1 year.”86
It adopted the multi-factor test from Lee Lumber & Building
Material Corp.87 to determine when exactly the recognition

79. Id.
80. See id. The NLRB pointed to some information regarding Dana filings it
had received since the Dana Corp. decision, and noted that these filings
indicated “employees decertified the voluntarily recognized union under the
Dana procedures in only 1.2 percent of the total cases in which Dana notices
were requested.” Id. at 4.
81. See id. at 2–4.
82. See id. at 5.
83. See id. at 5–6, 9–10 (“In no other context does the Board require that
employees be given notice of their right to change their minds about a recent
exercise of statutory rights.”).
84. See id. at 6.
85. See id. at 7–10.
86. See id. at 10.
87. Lee Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp., 334 N.L.R.B. 399, 402 (2001).
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bar’s effect ends in a given case.88
Much like Dana Corp., Lamons Gasket has already
received significant criticism. The dissent in Lamons Gasket
accused the majority of making “a purely ideological policy
choice, lacking any real empirical support and uninformed by
agency expertise.”89 One commentator described the opinion
as one of many chapters in employers’ “summer of discontent”
spearheaded by the Obama administration.90
The
congressional House Appropriations Committee has
threatened to cut off the NLRB’s funding to enforce this
decision.91 While there is certainly room for disagreement on
the issues raised in Dana Corp. and Lamons Gasket, it is
difficult to say that either decision sought to tackle illusory
problems or that the NLRB overreached its authority by
overruling Dana Corp. As the majority in Lamons Gasket
stressed, Dana Corp. was a rather novel decision that created
conflicts within a long line of precedent. Speaking in broad
terms, the difference between the two opinions boils down to
the attitude they take towards voluntary recognition as well
as their emphasis on employee choice versus industrial peace.
C. Proposed NLRB Regulations Affecting the Union
Recognition Process
In a rare exercise of rulemaking power,92 the NLRB
recently proposed some regulations that would have a
significant impact on the union election procedures and to a
lesser extent the voluntary recognition process.93 These
88. See Lamons Gasket, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 10 & n.34; see sources cited
supra note 63.
89. Lamons Gasket, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 11 (Hayes, dissenting).
90. Mark A. Spognardi, Employers’ Summer of Discontent: Obama Labor
Board Pushes Anti-Employer Agenda, WESTLAW J. EMP., Sept. 20, 2011, at 1.
91. See Glenn Spencer, House Appropriations Committee Stands Up Against
FREEDOM
INITIATIVE,
Regulatory
Onslaught,
WORKFORCE
http://www.workforcefreedom.com/blog/house-appropriations-committee-standsagainst-regulatory-onslaught (last visited Mar. 29, 2012).
92. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374
(1998) (“The National Labor Relations Board, uniquely among major federal
administrative agencies, has chosen to promulgate virtually all the legal rules
in its field through adjudication rather than rule-making.”). Indeed, in over
seventy years, the NLRB has promulgated only one significant substantive rule.
HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 102.
93. Particularly after the Dana Corp. decision, the voluntary recognition
procedure and NLRB-conducted-election procedure intertwine and overlap in
many significant ways, so changes to one can impact the other. See infra Part
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proposed regulations appeared in the Federal Register on
June 22, 2011.94 The proposed regulations are generally
viewed as favorable to unions.95 The stated goals of the
proposed regulations are as follows: (1) to streamline the
resolution of questions on union representation; (2) increase
transparency and the uniformity of these procedures; (3)
eliminate unnecessary litigation arising out of this process;
and (4) modify the process by which the NLRB reviews these
union-representation questions.96 This portion of the Article
will first discuss why the NLRB decided to implement these
changes and then outline some of the specifics of these
proposed regulations.
The proposed regulations contain a lengthy discussion by
the NLRB of why it chose to propose these new regulations
and specific areas where it had seen a need for streamlining
the representation process.97 The NLRB emphasized that
Congress intended that there be procedures in place to
determine questions regarding union representation both
quickly and fairly.98 The NLRB cited Congress’s findings that
such procedures would safeguard commerce from disruptions
and promote industrial peace.99 The Board then pointed to
various shortcomings in current union representation
proceedings, particularly with respect to narrowing the issues
in dispute in representation proceedings.100 The NLRB noted
that the lack of a requirement for responsive pleadings in

I.A–B. A more streamlined election procedure may also encourage more unions
to use that process as opposed to attempting to use voluntary recognition,
especially when faced with the hurdles of the Dana Corp. decision. See infra
Part I.A–B.
94. Representation-Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,812, 36,812 (proposed
June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 101–03). The NLRB stated that it
would accept initial comments on the proposed rules until August, 22, 2011. Id.
95. See Steven Greenhouse, N.L.R.B. Rules Would Streamline Unionizing,
TIMES,
June
22,
2011,
at
B3,
available
at
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/business/22labor.html.
96. Representation—Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,812.
97. See id. at 36,812–18. The NLRB also included a lengthy discussion of
the history and evolution of union recognition procedures. See id. A discussion
of the history of union recognition procedures, beyond what has already been
addressed in Parts II.A and II.B, is beyond the scope of this Article. For a
thorough summary of current representation case procedures, see id. at 36,817–
18.
98. Id. at 36,813.
99. See id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)).
100. See id. at 36,814–16.
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proceedings regarding representation under section 9 of the
NLRA allowed a non-petitioning party to not identify and to
not join the issues they intend to raise at a hearing.101 The
Board then stated that current regulations also do not
expressly provide for any form of summary judgment or offerof-proof procedures that would allow a hearing officer to
narrow the issues at a pre-election hearing by determining
whether there are any genuine disputes as to any material
facts.102
The NLRB further identified pre-election disputes over
individual employees’ eligibility to vote in an election as an
issue that frustrates the determination of the key inquiry
that should take place during this period of time, whether a
question concerning representation exists that an election is
needed to answer.103
Technological advances have also proven to be a
challenge. Given significant increases in technology and
newer methods of electronic communication that have come
into existence, the Board recognized the need for updating its
rules regarding an employer’s obligation to provide a list of
names and addresses of eligible employee voters.104 Likewise,
the Board recognized the need for updating its electronic
filing procedures to permit the filing of representation
petitions electronically.105
A wide variety of new procedural changes appear in these
proposed regulations.106 To avoid getting lost in the minute
details of these proposed changes, this Article will focus on
the most significant aspects of the proposed changes. With
respect to initial filing of a petition for certification or
decertification, the proposed changes would permit parties to
file petitions for certification or decertification electronically
and impose additional service requirements on the
petitioner.107 One of the additional service requirements is
the filing of a Statement of Position form.108 Failing to file
101. See id. at 36,814.
102. See id. at 36,815.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 36,815–16.
105. See id. at 36,816.
106. See generally id. at 36,818–47.
107. See id. at 36,819, 36,835–36.
108. See id. at 36,821, 36,838–39. This form will replace the current NLRB
Form 5081, the Question on Commerce Information. See id. Employers would
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this form precludes a party from raising certain issues at a
pre-election hearing and participating in the litigation of
those issues.109 Non-petitioning parties must also file a
Statement of Position form before a pre-election hearing.110
This form would solicit the parties’ position on the following
issues: (1) the Board’s jurisdiction to process the petition; (2)
the appropriateness of the petitioned-for bargaining unit; (3)
any proposed exclusions from the petitioned-for bargaining
unit; (4) the existence of any bar to the election; (5) the type,
dates, times, and location of the election; and (6) any other
issues that a party intends to raise at the pre-election
hearing.111 Parties that enter into one of the current election
agreements authorized in 29 C.F.R. § 102.62 that either avoid
the need for a pre-election hearing or limit the parties’ ability
to dispute some issues before the election112 would not need to
file a Statement of Position form.113
The proposed regulations would also codify and revise the
requirement initially recognized by the NLRB in In re
Excelsior Underwear, Inc.114 that an employer must provide
certain information to the proposed union regarding eligible
employee voters before an election occurs.115 These changes
would generally require the employer to provide this
information in electronic form and reduce the period of time
that an employer has to provide this list from seven days to
two days.116 The employer must also follow the same timing
guidelines when providing this list to the regional director
and the other parties rather than just file the list with the
additionally be required to file as part of the Statement of Position form the
information required by the newly codified Excelsior Underwear requirements.
See id. at 36,821–22, 36,838–39; Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236,
1239–40 (1966); infra notes 114–118 and accompanying text.
109. See Representation—Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,821, 36,838–
39.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. The proposed amendments further clarify the three forms of election
agreements already in existence under current law by labeling them with their
current common designations: (1) consent election agreements; (2) stipulated
election agreements; and (3) full consent election agreements. See id. at
36,819–20, 36,837.
113. See id. at 36,821, 36,838–39.
114. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239–40 (1966).
115. See generally Representation—Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,820–
21, 36,838, 36,843.
116. See id.
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regional director as under current law.117 Additionally, the
list must now contain the employees’ email addresses if
available in addition to their names and physical addresses
as required under current law.118
Regarding specific procedures that impact pre-election
hearings, the proposed amendments provide that, absent
special circumstances, the regional director must set the
hearing to begin seven days after service of the notice of
hearing.119 They also clarify that resolution of disputes
concerning the eligibility or inclusion of individual employees
is not ordinarily necessary in order to determine if a question
of representation exists and thus should not be addressed at
the pre-election hearing.120 The amendments also narrow the
scope of evidence that may be offered at hearings to that
[which is] relevant to any genuine dispute as to any material
fact.121 They also authorize the hearing officer to play a
greater role in identifying issues in dispute and determining
if there are genuine disputes as to facts material to those
issues.122 As discussed above, the Statement of Position form
requirements also place significant limitations on the parties’
ability to raise any issues at the hearing not raised in their
Statement of Position form.123
With respect to appeals, the first major change is that the
circumstances under which a request for special permission to
appeal under 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.65 and 102.67 have been
narrowed in order to avoid piecemeal appeals that would
disrupt
the
timely
disposition
of
questions
of
124
representation.
Parties filing objections to the conduct of
the election or to conduct affecting the results of the election
must also file a written offer of proof in order to demonstrate
factual support for their objection.125 Lastly, Board review of
post-election decisions made by one of the regional directors
117. See id.
118. See id. Excelsior Underwear only required that their names and
addresses be given. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. at 1239–40.
119. Representation—Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,821, 36,838. This
practice was in the past not uniform among the regions, although some regions
did follow this practice. See id. at 36,821.
120. See id. at 36,822, 36,839–40.
121. See id. at 36,822, 36,841.
122. See id. at 36,822–23, 36,841.
123. See id. at 36,823, 36,841.
124. See id. at 36,822, 36,840, 36,842–43.
125. See id. at 36,826, 36,844.
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would be discretionary rather than mandatory.126
The NLRB issued a final rule on December 22, 2011.127
The final rule deferred the final adoption of some aspects of
the proposed rule.128 Specifically, the Board decided to take
further time to review the proposed regulations regarding
“scheduling of the pre-election hearing, the requirement of a
statement of position, and the content and timing of eligibility
lists” as well as some other proposed rules.129 The NLRB
chose to do so because of the particularly large number of
comments it had received on these proposals.130
However, the NLRB decided to adopt some of the less
controversial proposed rules, treating them as severable from
the other proposed rules.131 The most notable rules it chose to
adopt include provisions that would: (1) direct that section
9(c) of the NLRA be construed such that the statutory
purpose of a pre-election hearing is to determine if a question
of representation exists; (2) give hearing officers presiding
over pre-election hearings the authority to limit the
presentation of evidence to questions of representation; (3)
give hearing officers presiding over pre-election hearings
discretion to permit or disallow post-hearing briefs; (4) defer
all requests for review of the regional director’s decision and
direction of election until after the election occurs; (5)
eliminate the codified recommendation that the regional
director should ordinarily not schedule an election sooner
than twenty-five days after the decision and direction of
election; and (6) create a uniform procedure for resolving
election objections and potentially outcome-determinative
challenges in stipulated and directed election cases and
provide that Board review of regional directors’ resolution of
such disputes is discretionary.132 These changes will go into
effect on April 30, 2012.133
Some have compared these changes to a regulatory
imposition of the EFCA, although the proposed regulations
126. See id. at 36,827, 36,844–45.
127. See Representation—Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 80,138 (Dec. 22,
2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 101–02).
128. See id. at 80,140.
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 80,141.
133. See id. at 80,138.
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are not as favorable to unions as the EFCA would have
For example, the proposed rules contain no
been.134
provisions requiring binding arbitration if labor and
management cannot agree to the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement.135 Furthermore, the EFCA contains
many more provisions that affect the voluntary recognition
procedure than these proposed regulations.136 Additionally,
as some labor supporters have argued, these proposed
regulations provide no guarantees for union election
timeframes even though they do in many ways streamline the
process.137 The terms of the EFCA more concretely allow
unions to accelerate the process of becoming the exclusive
bargaining agent for a group of employees.138 Some members
of Congress proposed trumping these regulations by statute,
but no such effort has materialized into legislation.139
II. UNDERSTANDING THE EFCA
A. Changes to Voluntary Recognition Contained in the EFCA
According to the preamble of the proposed EFCA bill, the
EFCA’s purpose is “[t]o amend the National Labor Relations
Act to establish an efficient system to enable employees to
form, join, or assist labor organization, to provide for
mandatory injunctions for unfair labor practices during
organizing efforts, and for other purposes.”140 Although the
bill actually predates the Dana Corp. decision, the bill does
contain language that would have abrogated that decision

134. Kevin Bogardus, Labor Bill Battle Reborn with NLRB’s New Union
Election Rules Proposal, THE HILL (June 26, 2011, 6:00 AM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/168483-labor-bill-battle-rebornwith-nlrbs-new-union-election-rules.
135. Representation—Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,812, 36,812–47 (June
22, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 101–103). The EFCA, on the other
hand, does contain such a provision. See H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 560,
111th Cong. (2009).
136. See infra Part II.A; supra notes 82–123.
137. Bogardus, supra note 134.
138. See infra Part II.A; supra notes 82–123.
139. See Seth Borden, NLRB Announces Final Rule to Expedite Elections;
Senator Announces Effort to Block Rule Via Congressional Resolution, LABOR
RELATIONS TODAY (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.laborrelationstoday.com
/2011/12/articles/nlrb-rulemaking/nlrb-announces-final-rule-to-expediteelections-senator-announces-effort-to-block-rule-via-congressional-resolution/.
140. H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009).

10_WALTERS FINAL.DOC

2012]

9/5/2012 10:41:47 AM

PROVOKING PREEMPTION

1051

before the NLRB chose to overrule that decision itself.141
Notably, the EFCA as proposed actually makes the voluntary
recognition procedure more favorable to unions than it was
before the Dana Corp. decision.142 Furthermore, the proposed
bill addresses issues unrelated to the Dana Corp. decision,
such as imposing various timelines on management to
negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with a union.143
The main changes that the EFCA would make to the
voluntary recognition process are: (1) the options an employer
has once the union has obtained majority support of the
employees as represented through appropriate cards; (2) the
involvement of the NLRB in investigating the cards to
determine if the union has majority support; and (3) the
abolishment of the changes Dana Corp. made to the
recognition bar.144 The text of the EFCA that would make
these changes, amending section 9(c) of the NLRA, is as
follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section,
whenever a petition shall have been filed by an employee
or group of employees or any individual or labor
organization acting in their behalf alleging that a majority
of employees in a unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining wish to be represented by an
individual or labor organization for such purposes, the
Board shall investigate the petition. If the Board finds
141. See In re Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434 (2007); Dillard & Dillard, supra
note 22, at 820 (“In contrast, Congress is considering the Employee Free Choice
Act (EFCA), which would not only overrule the Board’s decision in
Dana/Metaldyne but also mandate employer recognition of a union with a cardcheck showing of majority support.”) (footnote omitted); infra Part III. The
NLRB recently overruled the Dana Corp. decision in In re Lamons Gasket Co.
See In re Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 1–2 (2011).
142. Under current law, an employer can reject a card showing by the union
that it has obtained majority support and instead seek an NLRB conducted
election. See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 309–
10 (1974). The EFCA would change this current law by doing away with an
employer’s immediate right to challenge a card showing by the union. See H.R.
1409, 111th Cong.; S. 560, 111th Cong. The EFCA would instead place the
power in the NLRB’s hands to determine if the union has majority support. See
H.R. 1409, 111th Cong.; S. 560, 111th Cong.
143. H.R. 1409, 111th Cong.; S. 560, 111th Cong. If management does not
comply, the dispute would go to an alternative dispute resolution proceeding,
including binding arbitration. H.R. 1409, 111th Cong.; S. 560, 111th Cong.
This Article will not focus on any aspects of the EFCA other than the provisions
regarding voluntary recognition.
144. See sources cited supra note 143.
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that a majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
bargaining has signed valid authorizations designating
the individual or labor organization specified in the
petition as their bargaining representative and that no
other individual or labor organization is currently certified
or recognized as the exclusive representative of any of the
employees in the unit, the Board shall not direct an
election but shall certify the individual or labor
organization as the representative described in subsection
(a).145

Essentially, the Board would determine whether or not
majority support exists, rather than the employer himself.146
Furthermore, once the NLRB has determined that a majority
of workers did support the union, the employer could not
demand the holding of a secret ballot election.147
For
comparison, any employer who currently signs a card check
agreement agrees to waive this right to demand an election,
but employers that have not signed an agreement may
demand a secret ballot election.148 Lastly, the final sentence
of this subsection would require that the NLRB certify the
union immediately once it determines the union has majority
support.149
Notably, these provisions would effectively
overrule the result in the Dana Corp. decision.150 Because the
NLRB has recently overruled Dana Corp., any effects the
EFCA would have on that decision are of course now moot.151
B. Arguments for and Against the EFCA
Due to the nature of the changes that the EFCA would
bring about in the labor world as well as the politically
sensitive nature of the balance of power between
management and unions, the EFCA has generated a
significant amount of controversy. Some of the members of
Congress who spoke on the congressional floor the day the

145. See sources cited supra note 143.
146. See sources cited supra note 143.
147. See sources cited supra note 143.
148. See sources cited supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
149. See sources cited supra note 143.
150. Dillard & Dillard, supra note 22, at 820 (“In contrast, Congress is
considering the . . . EFCA[], which would not only overrule the Board’s decision
in Dana/Metaldyne but also mandate employer recognition of a union with a
card-check showing of majority support.”).
151. See In re Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 1–2 (2011).
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most recent version of the EFCA was proposed summarized
the main arguments for and against it. As stated by
Representative Stark, the proponents of the EFCA argue that
it: (1) benefits the economic interests of average Americans as
well as the economy as a whole; (2) prioritizes the rights of
individual workers; and (3) curbs some of the worst abuses by
employers:
Middle-class Americans are the backbone of the
economy, and yet they took a back seat to corporate giants
over the past eight years. The previous Administration
decided to protect big business at the expense of their
employees, and corporate profits ballooned while real
worker wages stagnated or even declined.
Right now, employers can use coercive tactics in the runup to an employer-forced election even when a majority of
workers want to form a union, they can stall indefinitely
during contract negotiations, and they can engage in
illegal labor practices and receive only a slap on the wrist.
American workers deserve better.
The Employee Free Choice Act levels the playing field
between employees and employers by allowing workers to
decide whether to hold a NLRB election or instead show
that a majority of workers support unionization. The Act
prevents employers from stonewalling and makes it easier
for employees to reach a collective bargaining agreement.
Finally, the Employee Free Choice Act stiffens penalties
against employers who violate the law.
The current economic recession makes passage of the
Employee Free Choice Act even more important. Workers
with higher wages will stimulate the economy, spur
investment, and get America back on the road to
prosperity.152

Proponents of the bill also point to the consistent drop in
union membership in the United States since the middle of
the twentieth century from the high point of roughly onethird of the country’s workers being members of a union.153

152. 155 CONG. REC. E620 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2009) (statement of Rep.
Stark).
153. See Cooper, supra note 22, at 1591 (“In the mid-1950s union density
reached its peak, including about a third of the workforce. By the mid-1970s
density had dropped to about a quarter of the workforce. Since then, the decline
has accelerated to the point that union membership in 2007 included only 12.1%
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On the other hand, critics of the EFCA argue that the
bill: (1) undercuts the rights of employees by undermining
secret ballot elections, thus taking away employee autonomy;
and (2) prioritizes union membership when nationwide union
membership already stands at a level high enough to
adequately safeguard workers’ rights.154 As Representative
Roe articulates, regarding the bill’s effect on workers’ rights,
“[T]he curiously named Employee Free Choice Act . . .
actually does the opposite of its title by taking away an
employee’s free choice to choose in secret whether or not to
join a union.”155 Likewise, to undercut arguments of waning
union membership nationwide, Representative Roe pointed to
recent statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics showing
that “union membership was just over 16 million in 2008, a
2.6 percent rise over 2007.”156 Another commonly raised
criticism of the EFCA centers on the economic impact it
would have on the job market and the economy as a whole.157
More specifically, opponents of the EFCA argue that the
legislation would burden employers who are already
overloaded with government regulations and prevent them
from creating more jobs in the process.158
III. CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY OF THE EFCA
The EFCA has a colorful legislative history in Congress.
On November 21, 2003, Representative George Miller first
introduced an early form of the EFCA.159 However, the bill
and its Senate counterpart never made it out of committee.160

of the workforce.” (footnote omitted)); Dillard & Dillard, supra note 22, at 819.
In 2010, union membership was approximately 11.9% of the workforce. News
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members–2010, at 1 (Jan. 21, 2011),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
154. See 155 CONG. REC. H3111 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2009) (statement of Rep.
Pitts); id. at H3112–13 (statement of Rep. Roe).
155. Id. at H3112 (statement of Rep. Roe).
156. Id.
157. Kris Maher, Economy Heightens Debate Over Bill to Ease Union
Organizing, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Nov. 1, 2008, at A3, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122549927797489907.html
(“Business
and
industry groups say the legislation, known as the Employee Free Choice Act,
will lead to massive job losses and hobble the economy.”).
(May
28,
2009),
158. Red
Tape
and
Scissors,
ECONOMIST
http://www.economist.com/node/13686444.
159. H.R. 3619, 108th Cong. (2003).
160. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-23, at 4 (2007) (Conf. Rep.).
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The bill once again stalled in committee when reintroduced in
2005.161 When the bill resurfaced in early 2007, it finally
made it out of committee and to the full House of
Representatives.162 The House on March 1, 2007 passed a
version of the bill by a vote of 241 to 185.163 Shortly
afterwards, former Senator Ted Kennedy introduced a
version of the bill in the Senate on March 29, 2007.164
Republicans successfully filibustered the bill in the Senate
when a motion to invoke cloture failed to pass by nine votes
with a final vote of fifty-one to forty-eight.165 On March 10,
2009, a few months after the 111th Congress was sworn in,
former Senator Ted Kennedy and Representative George
Miller both introduced a version of the bill in the Senate and
House respectively.166
When reintroduced in 2009, the bill faced the largest
hurdles in the Senate with the prospect of a potential
filibuster where Republican opposition to the bill was
uniform.167
Former Senator Arlen Specter, a moderate
Republican viewed as key to the passage of the bill, stated in
March of 2009 that he opposed the legislation.168 Democratic
Senator Ben Nelson of Nebraska also expressed his opposition
to the bill.169 Several other Democratic Senators stated that
they could not support the bill in its current form or that they
would prefer alternative legislation, including Arkansas
Senator Blanche Lincoln,170 Delaware Senator Thomas
161. See id.
162. See id. at 5.
163. 153 CONG. REC. H2091 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2007).
164. S. 1041, 110th Cong. (2007).
165. 153 CONG. REC. S8378-98 (daily ed. June 26, 2007).
166. H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009).
167. See James Oliphant, ‘Card Check’ Bill Loses Key Supporters, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 28, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/28/nation/na-card-check28
(“All along, Republicans have made it clear that they would try to stop the bill
with a filibuster. Specter’s announcement Tuesday means all forty-one Senate
Republicans are lined up against the measure.”).
168. See id. Senator Arlen Specter soon switched parties to become a
Democrat in late April of 2009 after he realized that he could not likely win the
upcoming Republican primary he faced and that the Republican Party in his
view had shifted too far rightward politically. See Carl Hulse, Specter Switches
Parties, N.Y. TIMES (April 28, 2009, 12:13 pm), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.
com/2009/04/28/specter-will-run-as-a-democrat-in-2010/.
169. See Ryan Grim, Ben Nelson Opposes Employee Free Choice Act,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 10, 2009, 02:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2009/03/10/breaking-ben-nelson-oppos_n_173548.html.
170. See Alec MacGillis, Drifting Right, Lincoln Comes Out Against EFCA,
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Carper,171 and California Senator Dianne Feinstein.172 The
focus of attention in Congress soon shifted to other
legislation, such as healthcare overhaul173 and financial
reform.174 Particularly with the loss of the Democratic super
majority in the Senate due to the January 2010 special
election upset in the Massachusetts Senate race following the
death of Senator Ted Kennedy,175 the original sponsor of the
bill in the Senate, the prospects of passing the EFCA quickly
dimmed.176 AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka claimed that
there would be a push to pass the EFCA in the lame-duck
session following the Democratic defeats in the 2010 midterm
elections,177 but no such effort ever materialized into
legislation in an otherwise active lame duck session.178
Given the uniform opposition of Republicans to the
EFCA179 and the results of the 2010 congressional midterm
elections, the loss of the Democratic majority in the House of
Representatives and the net loss of seven of sixty seats in the
U.S. Senate including the Democratic loss in Massachusetts
in January 2010, little likelihood exists that Congress will
pass the EFCA in the foreseeable future.180
However,
WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2009, 5:41 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/
2009/04/06/report_lincoln_comes_out_again.html.
171. Sean Hackbarth, Carper to Oppose Employee Free Choice Act, SENATUS
(Apr. 15, 2009, 12:29 PM), http://senatus.wordpress.com/2009/04/15/carper-tooppose-employee-free-choice-act/.
172. See Oliphant, supra note 167.
173. See Robert Pear & David M. Herszenhorn, Obama Hails Vote on Health
Care as Answering ‘the Call of History,’ N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2010, at A1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/22/health/policy/22health.html.
174. Editorial, Congress Passes Financial Reform, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010,
at A26, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/opinion/16fri1.html.
175. See John Fritze, Scott Brown Wins Massachusetts Senate Race, USA
TODAY (Jan. 19, 2010, 9:44 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/
onpolitics/post/2010/01/620007121/1.
176. Derrick Cain, Harkin Says He Does Not Have Enough Votes to Approve
EFCA, DAILY LAB. REP., May 14, 2010, at A-8.
177. Carter Wood, Card Check: Union Leader Implies Lame-Duck Push for
EFCA, SHOPFLOOR (Sept. 17, 2010, 10:13 AM), http://shopfloor.org/2010/09/
card-check-union-leader-implies-lame-duck-push-for-efca/14558.
178. See Laurie Kellman, Lame Duck Session Culminates with Big
Accomplishments for Democrats, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 23, 2010),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/23/lame-duck-session-democraticaccomplishments_n_800654.html.
179. See Oliphant, supra note 167.
180. See Calvin Woodward, 2010 Midterms Put Democratic Control On the
Line, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/11/02/election-results-2010-midterms_n_777475.html.
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voluntary recognition has become a somewhat more desirable
option for unions now that the NLRB has overruled its
decision in Dana Corp.181
IV. PREEMPTION IN THE CONTEXT OF LABOR LAW
A. The Gradual Federalization of Labor Law and Historical
Context
Until the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act
(“NIRA”) in 1933 and subsequently the NLRA in 1935, States
primarily regulated labor-management relations and union
activity.182 However, the role the States played in these areas
had already begun to decrease in the decades that preceded
the NIRA and NLRA. As early as 1898, Congress and various
federal agencies became involved in regulating union activity
related to railroad employees.183 In 1914, Congress began to
tacitly bless the organization of labor unions with the passage
of the Clayton Act, which provided an antitrust exemption to
labor organizations and decreased the ability of federal courts
to issue injunctions in labor disputes.184 Outside of various
laws passed during wartime, the passage of the Railway
Labor Act in 1926 marked one of Congress’s most significant
moves into the area of labor-management relations.185 Lastly,
the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 outlawed yellow-dog
contracts,186 gave greater recognition to a union’s ability to act
as the representative of an employee, and placed greater
restrictions on the federal courts’ ability to issue injunctions
against labor unions.187
181. See In re Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 72, at 1–2 (2011); supra
Part I.B.
182. HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 81–82, 905.
183. See id. at 78.
184. See Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, § 6, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006)).
The Norris-LaGuardia Act more
comprehensively deals with injunctions in labor disputes in modern times. See
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 101–115 (2006)); HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 67.
185. See generally Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as
amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–188 (2006)); see also HARPER ET AL., supra note
29, at 67–68.
186. Yellow-dog contracts are contracts where an employee agrees not to join
a union or be involved in union activities during the term of their employment.
HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 66.
187. See Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. at 70 (codified as amended at 29
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Once World War I broke out, wartime concerns created a
stronger federal interest in maintaining stable labormanagement relations. Following the federal seizure of roads
in 1917, the Railroad Administration recognized the rights of
rail workers to organize and bargain collectively in order to
reduce industrial strife during wartime that could affect
nationwide transportation.188
Likewise, the need for
consistent wartime production prompted President Wilson in
1918 to create the National War Labor Board to prevent labor
disputes.189
During this wartime period, this agency
protected workers who sought to organize and bargain
collectively by enforcing their right to do so.190 The purpose of
these and other changes at the federal level during this
period of time more directly related to promoting efficiency
and peace between labor and management during wartime as
opposed to promoting union membership and growth.191
The two key factors that influenced federal intervention
into the area of labor-management relations in the early
twentieth century were: (1) the changing dynamics of the
relationship between employees and employers; and (2) the
Great Depression. First, due to the changing dynamics
between employees and employers, the workplace in the early
twentieth century became a much different place than it had
been a century or even several decades earlier. Around the
turn of the twentieth century, states began to make their
corporate laws more favorable to corporations in order to
attract corporations to register in their state.192 Likewise, the
size of corporations and other business entities began to grow
significantly following the Civil War.193

U.S.C. §§ 101–115).
188. HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 78.
189. See BRUCE E. KAUFMAN, THE GLOBAL EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS: EVENTS, IDEAS AND THE IIRA 82 (2004).
190. See id. Technically speaking, the National War Labor Board did not
have much in the way of enforcement authority, but President Wilson exercised
his war powers to secure obedience to its decisions. See HARPER ET AL., supra
note 29, at 64.
191. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 64. Notably, after World War I
during the 1920s, the federal government did take a less active role in
protecting unions and allowed businesses to exercise a more free hand. See id.
192. See JOHN E. MOYE, THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 159 (6th ed.
2005); Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875–
1929, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 667, 667 (1989).
193. HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 32; KAUFMAN, supra note 189, at 16–
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These changes to the basic form of businesses largely
ended the personal relationship between employers and
employees that was more typical of smaller enterprises.194
When coupled with the strong demand for labor in this postCivil War period, these changes played a significant role in
the development of unions and the labor movement in
America.195 In a more industrialized workplace, employees
became more fungible thus reducing their individual
bargaining power.196 Significant increases in the migration of
employees also created more of a free-labor market.197
Workers became more willing to leave the countryside for
larger cities and even to leave their countries and move to
America for work.198 Additionally, the advent of the factory
and the use of heavy machinery posed new types of threats
within the workplace that were foreign or at least less
prevalent in a pre-industrial economy.199
Second, the pressure the Great Depression placed on
American workers arguably played the largest role compared
to any other factor in the federalization of labor laws.
National income plummeted from eighty-one billion dollars in
1929 to forty-nine billion dollars in 1932, with employee
17 (“As home production and artisanal workshops gave way to large-scale
mines, mills and factories, hundreds of thousands of workers were grouped
together in one enterprise under the centralized control of an owner and a cadre
of managers.”).
194. HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 32; KAUFMAN, supra note 189, at 15–
16.
195. HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 32.
196. KAUFMAN, supra note 189, at 16. That is not say that workers did not
benefit in a variety of ways from these changes that came from
industrialization. Commentators sometimes paint an idyllic picture of social
and economic conditions before this period of industrialization. See Ludwig von
Misses, Facts About the “Industrial Revolution,” THE FREEMAN, Feb. 1956,
reprinted in THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND FREE TRADE 53, 53–54 (Burton
W. Folsom, Jr. ed., 1996). However, in spite of some negative effects
industrialization had on the workplace (in the worst instances egregiously
negative effects), economic conditions did generally improve for many workers.
See id. at 53–55. For example, mass production made goods cheaper for
everyone, including workers. See id. at 56. Likewise, workers received
significantly higher wages as a result of some of these changes. See KAUFMAN,
supra note 189, at 25. Working hours for workers decreased as well as the
nineteenth century progressed. Id. Workers’ life expectancies also rose. Id.
197. KAUFMAN, supra note 189, at 16.
198. See id.
199. See id. The same was true for other types of workplaces that were
either foreign to a pre-industrial economy or became more prevalent as a result
of industrialization, such as railroads and mines. See id.
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wages sustaining the greatest losses.200 Private construction
dropped from $7.5 billion in 1929 to $1.5 billion in 1932.201
Over fifteen million people were unemployed in 1933, with
the national unemployment rate at its peak rising to roughly
twenty-five percent.202 Many businesses tried to avoid wage
cuts at first, but eventually a variety of industries began to
make these cuts as the Great Depression deepened.203 These
conditions led President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to push
for a variety of reforms as part of the New Deal program after
his presidential election in 1932.204 The National Industrial
Recovery Act (“NIRA”) was one of the first and most
In addition to
ambitious aspects of the New Deal.205
establishing minimum-wage and maximum-hours standards
in every industry, the NIRA created a federal statutory right
for employees to organize themselves into a union.206
Particularly with respect to the strength of the NLRB, the
agency charged with enforcing the NLRA, the NLRA was in
many ways broader and more favorable to employees than the
NIRA that preceded it.207
B. Modern Policy Rationales Supporting Labor Law
Preemption
With the passage of the NIRA and subsequently the
NLRA, Congress decided that the area of labor-management
200. HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 80.
201. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 87 (2003).
202. IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY
14–15 (1950); ROBERT FRANK & BEN BERNANKE, PRINCIPLES OF
MACROECONOMICS 98 (3d ed. 2007).
203. HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 80.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 81. The NIRA contained no real mechanisms to handle labor
disputes. See id. Consequently, President Roosevelt created by executive order
the National Labor Board to conduct representation elections and hold hearings
to determine whether firms had discriminated against employee organizers.
See id. This agency lacked any enforcement authority, however. Id. Notably,
the Supreme Court struck down the NIRA as unconstitutional in 1935. See
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 539–42, 546–51 (1935)
(striking down key provisions of the NIRA as an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power to the executive branch and as outside the scope of Congress’s
Commerce Clause powers). After Congress passed the NLRA in 1935, the Court
upheld that statute in 1937. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (upholding the NLRA as within Congress’s Commerce Clause
powers); HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 81.
207. HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 81–83.
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relations needed uniform federal standards.208 As Justice
Jackson once articulated in Garner v. Teamsters Union,
“Congress
evidently
considered
that
centralized
administration of specially designed procedures was
necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive
rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to
result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward
labor controversies.”209 While those who would seek pro-labor
or pro-business legislation from state legislatures may
complain about preemption in this area,210 the added cost of
understanding and complying with fifty different sets of state
laws would likely undermine any benefits gained from
increased state regulation.211 All of the following would be
potential consequences of delegating more power over labor
policy to the States: (1) compliance costs would rise for
businesses and unions; (2) attempted compliance with
inconsistent or conflicting state laws would increase
uncertainty for businesses and unions; (3) enforcement of
labor laws would become more difficult due to choice-of-law
and other multijurisdictional concerns; (4) inconsistency in
results would increase (potentially dramatically); (5) forum
208. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 190–95 (1978); HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 905; supra Part IV.A.
209. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953).
210. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking States Out of the Workplace, 117 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 225, 225–27 (2008), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/
images/pdfs/659.pdf.
211. See id. at 225–26, 228 (“At best, multiple layers of regulations create
complexities and redundancies that increase compliance costs and make
enforcement more difficult. At worst, inconsistencies or outright conflict make
compliance and enforcement nearly impossible. Exclusive federal regulation
would eliminate many of these problems and produce a more effective and
economically competitive workplace governance regime.”); Garner, 346 U.S. at
490–91 (“A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as
apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of
substantive law.”); David L. Gregory, The Labor Preemption Doctrine:
Hamiltonian Renaissance or Last Hurrah?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 509
(1986) (“Centralization of labor policy is essential because the NLRA, despite its
political defects, is far better suited to anchor and to guide the development of
labor policy than are the fifty separate states. If labor policy loses this
centralization, state courts will yield a volatile checkerboard of inconsistent
decisions, and labor law practice will disintegrate into raw forum shopping.”).
However, some would counter that “labor law preemption doctrine exists within
a bodyguard of exceptions making it at once one of the most complex and
indecipherable areas in all of employment law.” Henry H. Drummonds,
Reforming Labor Law by Reforming Labor Preemption Doctrine to Allow the
States to Make More Labor Relations Policy, 70 LA. L. REV. 97, 104 (2009).
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shopping would increase; and (6) the desirability of the
United States as a place of business would decrease for
foreign businesses.212
While it once made sense for States to regulate
employment practices that were truly local in nature, the
modern workplace is strikingly different than it once was.213
A large amount of employers are at least regional in nature,
and many others are national or international in scope.214
Comparing a localized dispute, such as a dispute between a
single employee and his employer over a covenant not to
compete, to a large-scale labor dispute, which can impact
hundreds of employees in several different states215 and can
bring even a large employer’s business to a screeching halt,
illustrates the point.216 State regulation does have its place
with respect to many types of employment issues impacting
concerns that have a more localized effect.217 In comparison,
the interests that the States have in employment and labor
policies decreases significantly when it comes to disputes that
have national and international consequences.218
Many complain about the politicized nature of federal
labor policy and the resulting congressional impasse this
situation creates.219
The point is well taken, but this
situation is far from a recent phenomenon.220 Additionally,
significant changes in federal labor law do take place as a
212. See Gregory, supra note 211, at 509; Hirsch, supra note 210, at 225–26,
228.
213. See Hirsch, supra note 210, at 228; supra notes 192–199 and
accompanying text.
214. See Hirsch, supra note 210, at 228.
215. One example would be the highly publicized case where the NLRB
brought an action against Boeing for retaliating against a union by moving a
factory from Washington to South Carolina. See Steven Greenhouse, Boeing
Labor Dispute Is Making New Factory a Political Football, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/business/
01boeing.html?pagewanted=all. This dispute, which has since reached a
resolution, affected at least two states, impacted thousands of workers and one
of the world’s largest airplane manufacturers, and involved a plant with
construction costs around $750 million. See id.; Chris Isidore, Boeing Unfair
Labor Charge Dropped, CNNMONEY (Dec. 9, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/
12/09/news/companies/boeing_nlrb/.
216. See Hirsch, supra note 210, at 225–28.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 20, at 1530.
220. See id. (stating that no major congressional revision of federal labor
laws has occurred since 1959).
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result of adjudications that take place within the NLRB, the
agency charged with implementing the NLRA, and ultimately
the federal court system.221 Likewise, politicization of labor
policy is far from a purely Congressional phenomenon.222 It
already happens at some level in all states when they shape
labor and employment laws within the areas that the states
may permissibly regulate.223 Allowing the states to exercise a
freer hand in regulating labor policy would simply change the
forum of this politicized battle rather than eliminate it.
While the end result in labor policy would of course be
different given that all fifty states would have the freedom to
adopt their own labor policy, politicization would not likely
decrease in any significant way.
C. Preemption Generally
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution
eliminates conflicts between federal and state law by
establishing that the Constitution and laws of the United
States will trump conflicting state law.224 It is important at
the start of a preemption discussion to distinguish between
the preemption of state substantive law and the preemption
of state court jurisdiction over federal claims. Both of these
types of preemption have particular significance in the field of
221. HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 99–105 (discussing the structure,
authority, and history of the NLRB).
222. One recent example would be the recent battles in various states over
whether to limit the rights of public sector unions at the state level. See A. G.
Sulzberger & Monica Davey, Union Bonds in Wisconsin Begin to Fray, N.Y.
Times,
Feb.
22,
2011,
at
A1,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/us/22union.html?pagewanted=all;
Ohio
Senate Votes Restrictions on Public Sector Unions, REUTERS (Mar. 2, 2011, 4:57
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/02/us-ohio-unions-vote-idUSTRE
7217HJ20110302.
In Wisconsin in particular, the debate has turned
particularly hostile and transformed the political landscape there.
See
Sulzberger & Davey, supra; Brendan O’Brien, Republican Senators Face Recall
Vote in Wisconsin, REUTERS (Aug. 9, 2011, 5:50 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/08/09/us-wisconsin-recalls-idUSTRE7783VT20110809.
223. See sources cited supra note 222.
224. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding.”); Howard A. Learner, Restraining Federal Preemption When
There Is An “Emerging Consensus” of State Environmental Law and Policies,
102 NW. U. L. REV. 649, 658 (2008).
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labor law. Each of these two types of preemption will be
discussed separately.
1. Preemption of State Substantive Law
Preemption is generally a question of congressional
intent.225
There is generally a presumption against
preemption of state substantive law, especially implied
Federal courts find preemption in
preemption.226
circumstances where “Congress’ command is explicitly stated
in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its
structure and purpose.”227 Preemption takes the form of
express preemption or implied preemption.228 Courts have
further identified two types of implied preemption: field
preemption and conflict preemption.229 The Supreme Court
has emphasized that the above categories of preemption are
not rigidly distinct.230 Thus, field preemption may be thought
of as a species of conflict preemption.231 However, practically
speaking, it is often easier to conceptualize field preemption
separately.
Field preemption occurs when the specific scheme of
federal regulation is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it.”232 Field preemption can of course be express
as well as implied.233 Conflict preemption occurs when either:
(1) “compliance with both federal and state regulation is a
physical impossibility”;234 or (2) state law “stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.”235 Thus, the term
conflict preemption is a bit misleading, as there need not be a
225. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990).
226. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); Fla. Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 146–52 (1963); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1947).
227. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
228. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990)
229. Learner, supra note 224, at 659.
230. English, 496 U.S. at 79–80 n.5.
231. See id.
232. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
233. See Henry Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the
Second Twentieth Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 469, 529 (1993).
234. Id. at 531.
235. Id.
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true conflict between the state and federal law in the sense
that compliance with each law is not possible.236 This second
prong of conflict preemption is particularly important with
respect to Garmon237 and Machinists238 preemption.239
Garmon preemption focuses on conduct protected by NLRA
section 7 or prohibited by NLRA section 8 while Machinists
preemption instead looks at conduct neither protected nor
prohibited by these sections but still outside the scope of
permissible state regulation.240
Predicting the result in preemption cases can often be
difficult.241 However, in the field of labor law, the operation of
the various labor preemption doctrines as forms of field
preemption reduces the number of close cases.242 As one
commentator articulates, courts largely ignore the normal
presumption against implied preemption in most labor
preemption cases.243
2. Preemption of State Court Jurisdiction over Federal
Claims
Preemption of state court jurisdiction over federal claims
is a distinct but related issue to the preemption of state
substantive law. Courts are much more willing to find
preemption of state substantive law than preemption of state
court jurisdiction over federal claims.244 While federal courts
236. See id. at 529.
237. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union Local 2020 v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236 (1959).
238. Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Emp’t
Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
239. See Drummonds, supra note 211, at 163 n.295.
240. See infra Part IV.D.
241. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 232 (2000) (noting
that most commentators view the Court’s “[m]odern preemption jurisprudence
[as] a muddle”); Jamelle C. Sharpe, Toward (A) Faithful Agency in the Supreme
Court’s Preemption Jurisprudence, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 367, 369 (2011)
(“Although the language used to describe the various preemption analyses
applied by the Court has remained stable for decades, the Court has struggled
to provide commensurate levels of outcome predictability in its preemption
decisions.” (footnote omitted)).
242. See infra notes 253–256, 287 and accompanying text.
243. Drummonds, supra note 211, at 163 n.295.
244. Compare Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458–59 (1990) (recognizing that
state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims under normal
circumstances unless Congress expressly ousts them of that jurisdiction under
the Supremacy Clause), with Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S.
88, 98 (1992) (recognizing that Congress can impliedly as well as expressly
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will sometimes find that Congress has impliedly preempted
state substantive law, federal courts will almost never find
that Congress has impliedly preempted state court
jurisdiction over federal claims.245 Congress must almost
always expressly oust state courts of jurisdiction to hear
federal claims in order for a federal court to find Congress
intended such a result.246 Notably, due to some of the
nuances of the well-pleaded complaint rule, even when
Congress has expressly preempted state court jurisdiction
over some types of federal claims, such as patent claims, state
courts still have jurisdiction over cases in which the
exclusively federal claim is only a counterclaim.247 Federal
courts, on the other hand, would not have subject matter
jurisdiction based on the federal counterclaim alone.248
In the field of labor law, federal courts are more willing to
find preemption of state court jurisdiction than they would be
in most other areas of federal law.249
The Garmon
preemption doctrine and to a lesser extent the Machinists
doctrine operate to divest state courts of jurisdiction over
some types of disputes.250 For purposes of this Article, the
Garmon preemption doctrine will be the most significant of
these three preemption doctrines.251
D. Labor Law Preemption
There are three key preemption doctrines in the area of
labor law within the context of the NLRA scheme: (1) Garmon
preemption; (2) Machinists preemption; and (3) Labor
Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) section 301
preemption.252 All of these preemption doctrines operate as
preempt state substantive law).
245. See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823–26 (1990);
supra note 244.
246. See Yellow Freight, 494 U.S. at 823–26; Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 458–59.
247. See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) (“Nor can federal
jurisdiction rest upon an actual or anticipated counterclaim. We so ruled,
emphatically, in Holmes Group. Without dissent, the Court held in Holmes
Group that a federal counterclaim, even when compulsory, does not establish
‘arising under’ jurisdiction.” (citation omitted) (citing Holmes Grp., Inc. v.
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002))).
248. See id.
249. See infra Part IV.D.
250. See infra Part IV.D.
251. See infra Part V.
252. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2006); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,
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either express or implied field preemption.253 Garmon and
Machinists operate as implied field preemption under the
conflict preemption principle of state law standing as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.254
Section 301
preemption is a form of express field preemption.255
One cannot overemphasize how broad some of these labor
preemption doctrines are. As one commentator puts it, “It
would be difficult to find a regime of federal preemption
broader than the one grounded in the National Labor
Relations Act.”256 However, Congress has not chosen to fully
occupy the field of labor relations to the extent it could under
the Commerce Clause, leaving some issues still subject to
state regulation.257 One odd characteristic of the area of labor
preemption is that Congress has remained virtually silent for
roughly fifty years on the issue of labor preemption even
though the federal courts have expansively developed these
labor preemption doctrines.258 Some would argue that these
labor preemption doctrines have little basis in congressional

208–13 (1985).
253. Drummonds, supra note 211, at 163 & n.295.
254. See id.; Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. Local
25, 430 U.S. 290, 295 n.5 (1977) (discussing the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction
under Garmon); Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v.
Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976) (specifying the general
contours of Machinists preemption); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s
Union Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959) (specifying the general
contours of Garmon preemption); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 490
(1953) (“Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of
specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its
substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result
from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies.”).
255. See Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 559–62 (1968). These types
of claims can always be heard in federal court as they are always removable,
but state courts still have jurisdiction over them. See Beneficial Nat’l Bank v.
Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6–8.
256. Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities and
States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1154 (2011).
257. See 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 2327 (John E. Higgins, Jr. et al., eds., 5th ed.
2006 & Supp. 2010) [hereinafter DEVELOPING LABOR LAW].
258. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 475 U.S. 608, 622 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“From the acorns of [two earlier] sensible decisions
has grown the mighty oak of this Court’s labor preemption doctrine, which
sweeps ever outward, though still totally uninformed by any express directive
from Congress.”); Drummonds, supra note 211, at 164.
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intent.259
Lastly, section 301 preemption deals with federal
common law displacing state law interpretation of collective
bargaining agreements.260 This Article will not focus in any
detail on section 301 preemption, since the state
constitutional amendments providing a right to a secret ballot
election do not implicate this type of preemption.
1. Garmon Preemption
With respect to the NLRA, Garmon preemption is the
oldest and broadest of the preemption doctrines in the field of
labor law.261 In a nutshell, Garmon preemption prevents the
state regulation of activities which clearly or that may fairly
be assumed to be “protected by § 7 of the [NLRA], or
constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8.”262 Absent a few
minor provisions within the NLRA, the statute does not
expressly state the extent to which it displaces state law.263
However, the Supreme Court has interpreted Congress’
preemptive intent under the NLRA quite broadly.264 The
Court felt that allowing States to regulate various forms of
labor disputes “so plainly within the central aim of federal
regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between the
power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by
state law.”265
Instead, the NLRB should in the first instance determine
whether section 7 or section 8 of the NLRB governs a
particular activity.266 As a later decision articulated, the
NLRB has “primary jurisdiction” over these issues.267 In its

259. See sources cited supra note 258.
260. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210–11 (1985).
261. See Drummonds, supra note 211, at 165–66.
262. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union Local 2020 v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
263. See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 257, at 2328; HARPER ET AL.,
supra note 29, at 905.
264. See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244; Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485,
490 (1953) (“Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of
specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its
substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result
from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies.”).
265. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244.
266. See id. at 244–45.
267. Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. Local 25, 430
U.S. 290, 295 n.5 (1977).
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operation, the Garmon preemption doctrine preempts both
state substantive law and state court jurisdiction over
disputes that fall within the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction.268
Despite Garmon’s relative age, the Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts still cite Garmon as a leading precedent
for one of the three basic labor law preemption doctrines.269
As with the application of many other types of
preemption, determining the exact scope of Garmon
preemption does not lend itself to a precise analysis. As
stated in Garmon, conduct “protected by § 7 of the [NLRA], or
[that] constitute[s] an unfair labor practice under § 8” falls
within the scope of Garmon preemption.270
To fully
understand how Garmon preemption operates, it is helpful to
think of four categories of potential cases: those where the
conduct involved in the dispute (1) is actually protected by
section 7; (2) is actually prohibited by section 8 as an unfair
labor practice; (3) is arguably protected by section 7; or (4) is
arguably prohibited by section 8 as an unfair labor practice.271
By definition, the first two categories fall within Garmon
preemption absent some exception or the application of some
of the limitations discussed in the following paragraphs.272
Courts, however, do not apply Garmon preemption quite as
rigidly when conduct prohibited by section 8 is involved.273
The basic analysis for the third and fourth categories of
cases operates in the same manner. Whether the state law in
question is one of broad “general application” or one
“specifically directed towards the governance of industrial
relations” is not dispositive in this preemption analysis.274
However, common sense would dictate that the state law in
question would more likely be preempted if it expressly
governs labor relations.275 The key inquiry is whether the
268. See Drummonds, supra note 211, at 167; supra notes 262, 264–67 and
accompanying text.
269. HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 908.
270. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244.
271. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 909–10 (using the same basic
approach of further subdividing Garmon preemption into various categories).
272. See infra notes 274–84 and accompanying text.
273. See infra notes 280–82 and accompanying text.
274. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 197 (1978).
275. See id. at 197–98, 198 & n.27. By the same token, laws of general
applicability are less likely to generate rules or remedies which conflict with
federal labor policy than the invocation of a special remedy under a state labor
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controversy presented to the state court is identical to or
different from that which could have been, but was not,
presented to the NLRB.276 This rationale reflects the concern
for protecting the NLRB’s primary jurisdiction.277 However,
the primary jurisdiction rationale does not apply when the
employee or union who could have presented the issue to the
NLRB has not done so and the employer has no acceptable
means of doing so.278 Nevertheless, preemption under these
circumstances may in some cases still be necessary in the
third category of cases.279
The distinguishing factor between the third and fourth
category is that courts are more willing to find preemption in
the third category, a case where the conduct involved in the
dispute is arguably protected by section 7. “[C]onsiderations
of federal supremacy . . . are implicated to a greater extent
when labor-related activity is protected than when it is
prohibited,” thus allowing a State more flexibility to exercise
concurrent jurisdiction regarding conduct not protected by
federal labor law.280 A greater need for preemption exists
because permitting States to exercise jurisdiction in certain
contexts might create a significant risk of misinterpretation
of federal law and the consequent prohibition of protected
conduct.281 Even when through gamesmanship a party avoids
presenting an issue to the NLRB by trying to litigate the
issue in other venues, the Supreme Court has recognized that
Congress may in some cases have preferred the costs inherent
in a jurisdictional hiatus as opposed to the frustration of
national labor policy that might accompany the exercise of
state jurisdiction.282
There are some exceptions to Garmon preemption. The
Supreme Court has emphasized that courts should not apply
Garmon inflexibly, particularly when “the State has a

relations law. See id.
276. See id. at 197.
277. See generally id. at 190–207.
278. See id. This problem arises because only if the union files an unfair
labor practice charge against the employer can the NLRB assess the scope of
protection under section 7 of the NLRA. See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra
note 257, at 2357.
279. See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
280. Sears, 436 U.S. at 200.
281. See id. at 203.
282. See id. at 201–03.
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substantial interest in regulation of the conduct at issue and
the State’s interest is one that does not threaten undue
To
interference with the federal regulatory scheme.”283
determine whether to depart from Garmon preemption in a
given case, courts take into account three factors: (1) whether
the underlying conduct is protected under the NLRA; (2)
whether there is an “overriding state interest” that is also
“deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility”; and (3)
whether a state cause of action would interfere with the
effective administration of national labor policy.284
2. Machinists Preemption
Machinists preemption, on the other hand, implicates
state regulation of conduct that Congress deems necessary to
leave unregulated and rather left to the free play of economic
forces.285 This doctrine mandates that States cannot regulate
conduct that, even though it does not fall within the
protection of section 7 or any prohibition of section 8 of the
NLRA, Congress intended to be “unrestricted by any
governmental power to regulate” since the conduct qualifies
as a permissible economic weapon consistent with the scheme
of labor regulation Congress adopted.286 Taking Machinists
preemption together with Garmon preemption leads to the
conclusion that Congress “has virtually banish[ed] states and
localities from the field of labor relations.”287
Notable
Supreme Court cases restricting a State’s ability to regulate
conduct on the basis of Machinists preemption include
preemption of state law regarding the ordering of union
employees to cease and desist a concerted refusal to accept
overtime assignments,288 the conditioning of a renewal of a
franchise upon settlement of a labor dispute,289 and the
prohibition of the use of state funds to promote or deter union

283. See id. at 188 (quoting Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners
of Am. Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977)).
284. See id. at 187–89.
285. See Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis.
Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976).
286. See id. at 141 (quoting NLRB v. Ins. Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 488–89
(1960)).
287. Estlund, supra note 20, at 1572.
288. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140–41.
289. Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 614 n.5 (1986).
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organizing.290
However, States do retain some authority to regulate
activity more loosely related to labor-management relations.
Examples of permissible state regulation of conduct or state
conduct itself falling outside of both Garmon and Machinists
preemption include: (1) state tort or breach of contract claims
based on promises of permanent employment made by an
employer hiring replacement workers during a labor strike;291
(2) minimum state labor standards regarding the terms of
employment;292 (3) state unemployment compensation
schemes that impose additional waiting requirements for
benefits when a person’s unemployment results from a labor
dispute;293 and (4) situations where a State acts as a
proprietor rather than as a regulator.294
V. POTENTIAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW PROVIDING A
RIGHT TO A SECRET BALLOT ELECTION
Next, it is time to turn to the primary question raised in
this Article, whether or not the state constitutional
amendments protecting an employee’s right to a secret ballot
election would be preempted under the NLRA. In the letter
the Acting General Counsel originally sent to the four
Attorneys General to advise them that these constitutional
amendments were preempted and in the complaint filed in
Arizona district court, the NLRB stated its argument as to
why these state constitutional amendments are preempted by
the NLRA.295 The letter and the complaint made the same
basic argument, but the letter went into more detail and
pointed to the relevant cases that control this issue.296 In
stating the legal basis for his position in this letter, the
Acting General Counsel relied primarily upon Linden Lumber
290. See generally Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60 (2008).
291. See generally Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 500–06 (1983).
292. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 754–58 (1985).
293. N.Y. Tel. Co. v. N.Y. Dep’t of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 537 (1979).
294. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders &
Contractors, 507 U.S. 218, 227 (1993).
295. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 18, at 2–4; Letter
from Lafe E. Solomon, Acting General Counsel, NLRB, to Tom Horne, Ariz.
Attorney
Gen.
1–3
(Jan.
13,
2011),
available
at
http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/234/letter_az.pdf;
NLRB,
supra note 9 (linking to each of the four letters).
296. See Letter from Lafe E. Solomon, supra note 295, at 1–2; Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment, supra note 18, at 2–4.
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Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB297 and NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co.,298 two U.S. Supreme Court decisions.299 He
argued that based on these decisions federal law provides
employees two different paths to pursue their section 7 right
to choose a bargaining representative, either through an
NLRB conducted secret ballot election or voluntary
recognition.300
He further concluded that the state
constitutional amendments in question allow only secret
ballot elections as a method of employees choosing union
representation and thus are preempted by operation of the
The language of these state
Supremacy Clause.301
constitutional amendments directly seeks this result, so a
further discussion of the specifics of each amendment is not
necessary.302
Looking to the applicable provisions of the NLRA and
applying the relevant cases, the Acting General Counsel’s
conclusion that these laws are preempted is quite persuasive.
As he concluded, Linden Lumber and Gissel both contain the
U.S. Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that employees have
two different paths to exercise their section 7 right to choose a
bargaining representative.303
Section 7 clearly states,
“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, [and] to
form, join, or assist labor organizations . . . .” Section 9(a)
allows employees to exercise those section 7 rights by electing
297. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 301 (1974).
298. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
299. See Letter from Lafe E. Solomon, supra note 295, at 1–2.
300. See id. at 2 (“The inevitable consequence of this Amendment is that
Arizona employers are placed under direct state law pressure to refuse to
recognize—or withdraw recognition from—any labor organization lacking an
election victory.”). The NLRB makes the same argument in the Arizona
complaint. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 18, at 2–4
(“The NLRA permits but does not require secret ballot elections for the
designation, selection, or authorization of a collective bargaining representative
where, for example, employees successfully petition their employer to
voluntarily recognize their designated representative on the basis of reliable
evidence of majority support, in accordance with Sections 7 and 9 of the
NLRA . . . .”).
301. See Letter from Lafe E. Solomon, supra note 295, at 2.
302. See sources cited supra notes 4–7 (providing the language of each
respective state constitutional amendment).
303. See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 304–06
(1974) (“We recognized in Gissel that while the election process had
acknowledged superiority in ascertaining whether a union has majority support,
cards may ‘adequately reflect employee sentiment.’ ” ); Gissel, 395 U.S. at 596–
98.
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or otherwise “designat[ing] or select[ing]” a representative.304
As discussed previously, the Supreme Court has interpreted
section 9(a) as authorizing voluntary recognition as a valid
alternative to an NLRB conducted election.305 Of course, this
right to use the voluntary recognition procedure has its basis
only as a statutory right that Congress could amend or do
away with as it pleases.306 However, until Congress does so
or the Supreme Court interprets section 9(a) differently,
Linden Lumber and Gissel stand as the definitive
interpretation of section 9(a). Thus, the labor policy at issue
is clear and must now be put in the context of the relevant
preemption doctrines.
Garmon preemption is the preemption doctrine
implicated by these state constitutional amendments that
protect the right to a secret ballot election. By their very
nature, Garmon preemption and Machinists preemption will
rarely apply to the same set of facts unless it is unclear
whether the conduct at issue is protected by section 7 or
prohibited by section 8.307 Garmon preemption focuses on
conduct protected by section 7 or prohibited by section 8 while
Machinists preemption instead looks at conduct neither
protected nor prohibited by these sections but still outside the
scope of permissible state regulation.308 Looking to the
specific rights at issue leads to the conclusion that Garmon is
the relevant preemption doctrine. First, the Supreme Court
has already concluded that the conduct at issue is protected
by section 7 of the NLRA, which by definition makes the issue
fall within Garmon preemption.309
Second, Garmon
preemption focuses on issues “plainly within the central aim
of federal regulation” that the NLRB should determine in the
first instance.310 Machinists preemption instead focuses more
on issues that do not fall within the core of the NLRA scheme,
specifically economic weapons neither expressly allowed nor
prohibited under the NLRA that the States still do not have

304. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 159(a) (2006).
305. See supra Part I.A.
306. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
307. See supra Part IV.D.
308. See supra Part IV.D.
309. See supra Part IV.D; supra note 303.
310. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union Local 2020 v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).

10_WALTERS FINAL.DOC

2012]

9/5/2012 10:41:47 AM

PROVOKING PREEMPTION

1075

the ability to regulate.311 The scope of employee rights to
select a bargaining representative, a central issue in the
NLRA framework of labor and management relations, more
clearly falls within the concerns of Garmon preemption.312
The process of selecting a bargaining representative is
likewise not an economic weapon.313
Applying Garmon to these state constitutional
amendments leads to the conclusion that these state
constitutional amendments would be preempted. Putting this
question into the context of the four categories of Garmon
preemption cases discussed earlier in Part IV.D.1, a case
involving this particular question would fall into the first
category, conduct that is actually protected by section 7 of the
NLRA.
Employees taking advantage of the process of
voluntary recognition to organize in the form of a labor union
is protected by section 7 of the NLRA.314 The U.S. Supreme
Court has expressly recognized this fact in two decisions,
Linden Lumber and Gissel.315 A greater need for preemption
exists when labor-related activity is protected under the
NLRA rather than prohibited by it.316
Looking at the strength of this particular preemption
argument, it is relatively clear that the processes through
which employees choose their bargaining representative falls
“plainly within the central aim of federal regulation.”317 Here,
several states are attempting to modify the exercise of
employees’ section 7 right to select a bargaining
representative, labor-related activity that is protected under
the NLRA.318 One of the NLRB’s key functions is to conduct
union representation procedures and resolve disputes that
arise out of them.319 Allowing states to dictate what rules the
NLRB must follow in a particular state on questions of union
representation would completely disrupt the NLRB’s primary
311. See supra Part IV.B.
312. See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244.
313. See supra Part IV.B.
314. See sources cited supra note 303.
315. See sources cited supra note 303.
316. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 200 (1978); supra notes 280–282 and accompanying
text.
317. See Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244.
318. See id.; sources cited supra notes 4–7 (containing the text of the state
constitutional amendments at issue).
319. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2006).
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jurisdiction over these kinds of issues.320
Furthermore, the right to choose a representative for
employees is one of the first rights enumerated in NLRA
section 7, the key source of employees’ right to organize under
the NLRA.321 Additionally, the right of employees to choose a
representative is subject to extensive regulation by Congress
and the NLRB as evidenced by the level of detail in section 9
of the NLRB that deals with NLRB election procedures322 as
well as existing and proposed NLRB regulations that regulate
this process.323 The rights employees may exercise and
procedures they must follow when selecting a bargaining
representative are core aspects of the NLRA.324 Permitting
these state constitutional amendments to coexist with the
NLRA would create “too great a danger of conflict between
the power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by
state law.”325
None of the factors courts utilize to determine whether to
depart from Garmon preemption under a particular set of
circumstances weigh in favor of an exception to preemption
here.326 The three factors are as follows: (1) whether the
underlying conduct is protected under the NLRA; (2) whether
there is an “overriding state interest” that is also “deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility”; and (3) whether a
state cause of action would interfere with the effective
administration of national labor policy.327
First, the
underlying conduct, employees taking advantage of the
process of voluntary recognition to organize in the form of a
labor union, is protected under the NLRA as discussed in the
previous paragraphs. It is necessary to distinguish the
Supreme Court decision Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant
Employees Local 54 where the Court stated that the section 7
right to select bargaining representatives is not absolute and

320. See supra Part IV.D.1.
321. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
322. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 159.
323. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 101–02 (2011); supra Part I.C.
324. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 159; San Diego Bldg. Trades Council,
Millmen’s Union Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
325. Garmon, 359 U.S at 244.
326. See Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. Local 25,
430 U.S. 290, 298 (1977).
327. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180, 199–00 (1978).
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that some state law on the issue may permissibly exist due to
some federal statutory exclusions.328 That decision dealt with
some relatively narrow issues, the qualifications and
responsibilities of union officials.329 Brown did not deal with
the basic procedures employees may use to select a
bargaining representative, an NLRB conducted election, or
voluntary recognition.330 Therefore, it is unlikely that Brown
would foreclose a finding of preemption under these
circumstances.331
Second, no such overriding state interest deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility exists. Federal regulation of
union representation procedures has taken place to some
extent since World War I and comprehensively starting in
1933.332 Given this lengthy history of federal regulation of
union representation procedures, it is difficult to articulate a
plausible “overriding state interest” that is “deeply rooted in
local feeling and responsibility.”333 Furthermore, the timing
of the passage of these state constitutional amendments as
well as the currency of the controversies over voluntary
recognition, the Dana Corp. decision, and the potential
passage of the EFCA undercut the argument that this issue
has historically been one of state concern.334
Third, a state cause of action for violation of a state right
to a secret ballot election in a union election would interfere
with the effective administration of national labor policy.335 If
these state constitutional amendments were given effect, it is
entirely conceivable that parties would seek to battle out
these issues in state courts rather than before the NLRB in
order to circumvent the terms of the NLRA itself and federal
precedent interpreting the NLRA. It might even be possible
that a state agency would attempt to enforce these laws
against the NLRB in a way that would require the NLRB to
follow state law when certifying a union under the NLRA.
328. See Brown v. Rest. Emps. and Bartenders Int’l Union Local 54, 468 U.S.
491, 506 (1984).
329. See id. at 504–09.
330. See id. at 509.
331. See id.
332. See supra Part IV.A.
333. See Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. Local 25,
430 U.S. 290, 298 (1977).
334. See id.; supra Part Introduction–I.A–B, II–III.
335. See Farmer, 430 U.S. at 298; supra Part I.A.
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This type of situation would be one that would interfere with
the effective administration of national labor policy, as it
would hamper the NLRB in carrying out one of its basic
functions.336
The law in this area has enough clarity that it is this
author’s position that the NLRB will succeed in its actions
against any of these four states on the issue of whether these
state constitutional amendments are preempted. One must
always remember that preemption in the field of labor law
goes further than in most every other area of law.337 Given
the breadth of labor preemption, it is difficult to make a
convincing case that these state constitutional amendments
that impact such a central issue in the NLRA statutory
scheme can survive the NLRA’s broad preemptive effect.
CONCLUSION
Putting aside the controversy over the EFCA, Dana
Corp., and voluntary recognition in general, the preemption
issue regarding these state constitutional amendments is
relatively straightforward. Furthermore, any other result
would undermine the benefits that preemption provides in
the area of labor law. Given the politically polarizing nature
of labor policy, it is not a stretch of the imagination to predict
that States would adopt wildly disparate labor standards on a
countless range of issues if the NLRA did not preempt laws
such as these state constitutional amendments.
The
resulting hodgepodge of laws from the States would carry
with them the cost of confusion in trying to comply with the
law, constant change from fifty different legislatures and
court systems, and inconsistency in management and
workers’ rights.338 The current system, while certainly not
perfect, avoids many of these problems that would hurt both
management and labor unions. The United States would be a
less favorable business climate to domestic and foreign
businesses absent the NLRA’s preemptive effects.
The controversial nature of these topics does reveal,
however, the deeply rooted politicization that has taken hold
of federal and state labor policy. While broad preemption

336. See sources cited supra note 335.
337. See supra Part IV.C–D.
338. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
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does result in consistency and uniformity in the field of labor
law, some commentators argue that the entire area of law has
stagnated because of it.339 They have proposed that the
States should play a larger part in the formation of labor
policy because of the NLRB’s ineffectiveness at administering
the federal labor law scheme and the constant Congressional
turmoil over labor policy.340 Likewise, the NLRB itself has
been continually criticized for reversing its prior decisions for
questionable reasons arguably motivated more by politics
than policy.341 This general situation undermines the benefits
of consistency and uniformity that federal preemption should
help achieve. Some of these problems may be an unavoidable
part of the political process, but labor law nonetheless ranks
near the top of the list as one of the most politically
controversial areas of law. While such a climate may
ultimately result in more gains for management or for labor,
it frustrates one of the underlying goals of the NLRA,
industrial peace.342

339. See, e.g., Drummonds, supra note 211, at 97–103; Estlund, supra note
20, at 1527–31.
340. See sources cited supra note 339.
341. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A
Plea for Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163, 163–69 (1985).
342. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006); HARPER ET AL., supra note 29, at 86–87.

